Based on a dynamic model of the stochastic repayment behavior exhibited by delinquent credit-card accounts in the form of a self-exciting point process, a bank can control the arrival intensity of repayments using costly account-treatment actions. A semi-analytic solution to the corresponding stochastic optimal control problem is obtained using a recursive approach. For a linear cost of treatment effort, the optimal policy in the two-dimensional (intensity, balance)-space is described by the frontier of a convex action region. The unique optimal policy significantly reduces a bank's loss given default and concentrates the collection effort onto the best possible actions at the best possible times, so as to minimize the sum of the expected discounted outstanding balance and the discounted cost of the collection effort, thus maximizing the net value of any given delinquent credit-card account.
Introduction
The performance of numerous financial institutions critically depends on the efficient collection of outstanding unsecured consumer debt, a leading example of which is given by defaulted credit-card accounts. By the end of 2017, the aggregate revolving consumer credit in the United States well exceeded $1 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank G.19, January 2018). At an average delinquency rate of 2.2% (FRB 2018), the resulting size of the delinquent debt pool of more than $20 billion means that the issuing banks' exposure to nonperforming loans and their outstanding capital are highly sensitive to collection yields.
Based on the dynamic repayment model by Chehrazi and Weber (2015) , we determine optimal collection strategies for overdue, so-called "delinquent," credit-card accounts. The repayment process, which for a given account specifies the timing and magnitude of the random repayments, is represented as a self-exciting point process in continuous time. The conditional arrival rate of future repayments (intensity) depends on the information revealed by past repayments and can be controlled by costly account-treatment actions. Both the magnitude and the timing of the account-treatment actions are subject to optimization. The cost of taking a given action is assumed to be a linear function of its impact on the point-process intensity. The bank's creditcollection problem is to determine a dynamic collection policy that maximizes the net present value of an account.
In an infinite-horizon setting, which for a bank and its affiliates amounts to "going concern" for the account, the collection strategy becomes a time-invariant mapping from the action and holding subsets of the state space, characterized by the complement and the boundary of the two-dimensional inaction region respectively, to the collection action set. Using the Bellman equation as a sufficient condition for optimality, we characterize the bank's optimal collection policy as a function of the "state" of an account, in terms of its current repayment intensity and the remaining outstanding balance. The solution, which is obtained in quasi-closed form, exhibits a recursive structure in terms of the (maximal) number of repayments i(w) for the outstanding balance w to drop below a balance threshold below which active collections no longer add value. The maximal number of iterations i(w) can be precomputed for any account state as a function of the marginal account-treatment cost and the (empirically observed) account sensitivity with respect to collection actions.
The results have broad implications for collections management. First, given an identified model, a collections manager can use the optimal policy to determine the nature and timing of value-maximizing accounttreatment actions. Second, the optimized (dynamic) net present value of an account implies at any point in time a threshold for early account settlement at less than 100% of the outstanding balance. Third, using the expected value of treated accounts in defaults, the bank can provide more precise estimates for the expected loss given default (LGD), which in turn enhances the bank's compliance with capital-reserve requirements as introduced in the Basel II accords. Moreover, the dependence of the minimum expected LGD on account attributes (and holder characteristics) may be used at the underwriting stage to curb excess exposure to risky clients and enhance the quality of the bank's loan portfolio. Lastly, the results suggest new experiments for banks to better identify and test particular collection actions that show promise in improving the account workout.
Literature

Credit Management
The management of consumer credit addresses the three main phases in the life of an account: underwriting, treatment, and recovery (Rosenberg and Gleit 1994) . Underwriting decisions, concerning how much credit to grant (including no credit) usually depend on discriminant analysis and associated scoring methods (Bierman and Hausman 1970; Thomas 2000 ; Thomas et al. 2005) . Treatment of an account in the absence of default on payments includes decisions about charge authorization, promotions, annual percentage rates, and creditline extensions-be they positive or negative (Trench et al. 2003 ). In particular, credit risk can be re-assessed repeatedly over the lifetime of an account (Crook et al. 2007 ). Finally, after a consumer defaults on a loan with respect to a specified repayment schedule, the credit-issuing bank enters recovery mode by putting the account in credit collections. The optimization of the associated account-treatment actions is the subject of this paper.
Credit Collections
In a seminal contribution, Mitchner and Peterson (1957) examine the optimal pursuit duration of credit collections as a stopping problem in continuous time. Based on historical data, they assume that the probability of repayment is decreasing in the pursuit time, and find that it is optimal to stop collections when the expected repayment amount upon "conversion" of the account (from nonpayer to payer) equals the cost of pursuit measured in dollars per time unit. The authors realized that information is being revealed by the history of the repayment behavior:
"The problem of the collection of charged-off loans bears an interesting analogy to games such as certain types of poker in which betting takes place several times prior to the completion of a hand. In order to stay in the game it is necessary to continue betting. After each round of cards has been dealt, the player has additional information on which to base his decision as to whether to throw in his hand or to continue paying in order to stay in the game." (ibid., pp. 525-526)
Based on linear pursuit costs, Mitchner and Peterson estimated a gain of 33% in account repayment net of collection costs from applying their strategy. They further noted that in "a fully rigorous treatment, the entire sequence of intervals between payments, as well as the payment amounts, should be taken into account as part of the over-all stochastic process. However, such a procedure would complicate the problem enormously" (ibid., pp. 537-538). With the aid of recent advances in the theory of stochastic control, we formulate and solve the credit-collection problem in continuous time, while allowing both the repayment amounts and interarrival times to be random and to influence each other.
After a 15-year hiatus of results, Liebman (1972) considers a discrete-time Markov decision problem based on transition probabilities conditional on characteristics such as account age, volume class (binary), and experience class (binary), which can be solved numerically using value iteration. With finer resolution of account characteristics, this approach suffers from the curse of dimensionality, thus diverting attention to numerical analysis and resulting in a lack of structural insights. Since the 1970s, the credit-collection problem remained again dormant in the literature until the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004) introduced capital-reserve requirements based on LGD, which for delinquent credit-card debt corresponds to the expected discounted remaining outstanding balance plus the expected cost of collections. In a discrete-time Markov decision framework, Almeida Filho et al. (2010) examine the optimal timing of a given sequence of accounttreatment actions, but their analysis does not condition the actions on account-specific repayment behavior. Our model is based on Chehrazi and Weber (2015) , who propose a repayment model in terms of self-exciting point processes which can be identified using the full variety of data sources available to the issuing bank. While their study focusses on the prediction of repayment behavior conditional on a sequence of account treatment actions, we are concerned here with the problem of determining an optimal sequence of treatment actions, including the timing of these interventions. To the best of our knowledge this is the first continuous-time treatment of the dynamic credit-collection problem.
From a behavioral viewpoint, consumers may be more impatient with respect to payoff delays in the short run than in the long run, which may lead to dynamically inconsistent preferences, and a certain "present-bias" (Laibson 1997; ). 1 Although the self-excitation feature in the assumed repayment process might at first sight suggest the contrary, our model makes no explicit assumption about debtors' preferences. Indeed, we show that a self-exciting point process is qualitatively consistent with a Bayesian variant of our model (examined in Appendix C). Our model does not explicitly consider the debtor's dynamic choice problem, involving the tradeoff between consumption, debt repayment, and the possibility of personal bankruptcy, that might drive his repayment decisions. There is in fact at best weak evidence on consumers' strategizing personal bankruptcy decisions (Bertaut and Haliassos 2006) . Moreover, the lack of debtors' bargaining power and banks' reputational cost of engaging in systematic debt renegotiations (decreasing its power to commit to future collections) both tend to reduce the salience of a strategic approach to the collection problem, unlike situations of sovereign debt (Fernandez and Rosenthal 1990) or corporate debt (Roberts and Sufi 2009 ). Nevertheless, explicit strategic considerations may provide for interesting future extensions of this research.
with regime shifts (Guo et al. 2005 ). Henderson and Hobson (2008) find an analytical solution to an assetselling/consumption problem which involves a diffusion without jumps, where it may be optimal to use both instantaneous controls and discrete impulse controls. Yang and Zhang (2005) consider a portfolio investment problem for an insurance company with a cash flow that is governed by a jump-diffusion process due to the uncertain arrival of claims. In their setting, the problem terminates when the insurance company is ruined; by contrast, the credit-collection problem ends once the outstanding balance has been repaid in full. The solution to the credit-collection problem presented here is exact and can in principle be obtained in closed form, although the resulting expressions involve hypergeometric functions (as in Davis and Zervos 1998) which do not provide good intuition and are therefore omitted.
This work is closest to Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2009) who track the state of an unobservable Markov jump process by observing a compound Poisson process whose local characteristics (i.e., its intensity and mark distributions) depend on the state of the unobservable Markov jump process. Specifically, given a prior belief over the initial state of the unobservable Markov jump process, they obtain piecewise deterministic dynamics for the updated beliefs via Bayes' rule and, based on this, determine a tracking policy that maximizes an agent's expected net benefit. In principle, our problem may be cast into this formulation by viewing the repayment process as an observable compound Poisson process whose intensity is the unobservable Markov jump process. Our intensity can then be viewed as a Bayesian estimate of the true (unobservable) repayment intensity. Although the dynamics of our intensity are not exactly the same as in Bayraktar and Ludkovski (2009) , it does have a similar structure, for it features a positive jump when a repayment is received (exhibiting self-excitation) and declines exponentially during periods of inactivity. Our problem differs because our objective is to influence and not to track the state of an unobservable Markov jump process (corresponding to the repayment intensity) and therefore our control variable is different. However, the solution technique is similar in that (exact) restrictions of the value function are obtained iteratively, indexed by the number of remaining potential interventions, which in turn are determined by the number of possible future contacts with the frontier of the action region conditional on minimum-size repayment events.
Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we introduce the model for the repayment process and formulate the collection problem as a stochastic optimal control problem. Sec. 3 provides a sufficient optimality condition and then proceeds to the construction of a unique analytical solution to the collection problem for arbitrary initial data. In Sec. 4, we examine properties and practical aspects of the optimal collection strategy. Sec. 5 concludes.
Model
A credit-card account which misses the repayment deadline on its outstanding balance by more than a prespecified time period (e.g., 30 days) is called 'delinquent' and placed in collections. To optimize the collectiontreatment actions, consider such a delinquent account with outstanding balance w that enters the collection process at time t = 0 to remain there for t ≥ 0 until full repayment is received by the bank. 4 
Repayment Process
bank dynamically updates its belief on the holder's intentions to repay the debt (see Appendix C for analytical details).
Specifically, in the absence of any collection attempt ("account-treatment action"), the account holder's conditional repayment rate λ(t + s), for s ≥ 0, is given by the flow λ(t + s) = ϕ s, λ(t) λ ∞ + λ(t) − λ ∞ e −κs , as long as there is no repayment in the time interval (t, t + s]. The mean-reversion rate κ determines the speed with which the repayment intensity approaches its long-run steady state λ ∞ ; the latter generally depends on the macroeconomic environment. 5 In particular, when starting at λ(t) > λ ∞ , the arrival rate ϕ(s, λ(t)) is exponentially decreasing, dissipating the memory of past repayment behavior or account-treatment actions. Thus, if N (t) denotes the number of repayments on [0, t], the conditional probability of the next repayment time T N (t)+1 to exceed t + s is
where F t , as an element of a standard information filtration F, 6 contains all available information at time t. These dynamics are illustrated in Fig. 2b ; they are consistent with Bayes' rule-a period of inactivity lowers the bank's estimate of the unobserved repayment intensity. At any repayment time T i , the holder's outstanding balance W (T i ) diminishes by the received repayment
In line with institutional practice, we assume that over the course of the collection process, the issuer does not accrue interest on the remaining outstanding balance. As a result, W (t) remains constant between consecutive repayment events. The repayment sequence (
and corresponds to the percentage of the remaining outstanding balance (i.e., W (T i−1 )), received with the repayment Z i ; the expected relative repayment isr
At any repayment event i, the holder's repayment intensity increases by δ 10 + δ 11 R i , so λ(T i ) = λ(T − i ) + δ 10 + δ 11 R i . As detailed in Chehrazi and Weber (2015) , the parameters δ 10 and δ 11 measure the holder's willingness-to-repay (i.e., the sensitivity of λ(t) with respect to N (t) i 1 {T i ≤t} ) and ability-to-repay (i.e., the sensitivity of λ(t) with respect to R(t) i R i 1 {T i ≤t} ), respectively. For a given account, these two dimensions of the repayment process pertain to the number of observed repayments and the relative magnitude of these repayments: while frequent repayments tend to indicate a high willingness-to-repay, the account holder's ability-to-repay might still be quite low, e.g., in the case where the holder's checks are bouncing or the repayments do not add up to a significant portion of the outstanding balance. Again, the positive jump introduced by a repayment is consistent with Bayes' rule: observing an event increases the bank's estimate of the repayment intensity (see Fig. 2b ).
Remark 1.
In the absence of any account-treatment action, the "autonomous" repayment dynamics follow an affine, self-exciting point process (Hawkes process). In that case, the repayment intensity satisfies the stochastic differential equation (SDE)
where J(t) [N (t), R(t)] denotes the repayment process, with N (t) a counting process for the number of repayments and R(t) a process describing the relative magnitude of repayments. The parameter vector δ 1 [δ 10 , δ 11 ] captures the account holder's willingness-and ability-to-repay. The model parameters can be identified using estimation techniques developed by Chehrazi and Weber (2015) who also show the empirical significance of the self-excitation term for predicting consumers' repayment behavior, based on a data set from the credit-card industry (see Appendix D for details). 5 The chance of recovering an outstanding balance in the long run increases in λ∞. The empirical regularity of observing larger repayments during an economic boom is reflected by a probabilistic increase in the number of repayments (Chehrazi and Weber 2015) . 6 The standard information filtration F represents the internal history of the repayment process (Ti, 
Collection Problem
At any time in the collection process, the card issuer (bank) or a designated party (collection agency) can take account-treatment actions, usually in the form of attempts to collect all or part of the outstanding debt. These actions, in the form of establishing contact, negotiating a repayment plan, or filing a lawsuit, often do not lead to an immediate repayment, but merely increase the likelihood of receiving a (partial) repayment in the future. The process A = A(t) : t ≥ 0 , with A(0) = 0, encapsulates the bank's collection strategy; it is nondecreasing, left-continuous (predictable), and adapted to F. Taking a collection action produces a thrust in the dynamics of the repayment intensity,
where the sensitivity δ 2 describes the responsiveness of the account to its treatment. The change of A is viewed as a proxy for the collection effort, dA(t), necessary to carry out the corresponding account-treatment action. 7 The cost of collection is assumed to be linear with constant marginal cost c > 0, consistent with a collection effort measured in hours spent on an account's workout. The bank's collection problem is to find an admissible collection strategy A * = A * (t) : t ≥ 0 ∈ A that solves
where A is the set of left-continuous, nondecreasing, adapted processes. An optimal collection strategy produces the minimum net expected loss w + v * (λ, w), consisting of the unrecovered outstanding balance plus collection cost, given the initial intensity λ and initial balance w. Conversely,V * (λ, w) −v * (λ, w) represents the (optimized) expected economic value of the outstanding loan, net of collection costs.
Although the bank's collection problem is formulated over an infinite horizon, for a "collectable" account of positive value, the optimal pursuit time is endogenously bounded; see Sec. 3.2.2. Whether the pursuit time should be exogenously bounded or not depends on the specifics of a country's statute of limitations 8 for unsecured consumer debt or else on bank-internal guidelines. An infinite horizon reflects a going concern for an account and naturally accommodates optimal stopping problems, e.g., by including considerations of early settlement.
Optimal Account Treatment
The optimal solution to the collection problem (P) consists of a sequence of account-treatment actions. Treatment actions are taken when the account's repayment intensity falls below an intensity threshold determined by the account's current outstanding balance and its characteristics. The intensity threshold reflects a minimal arrival likelihood for repayments that needs to be maintained throughout an active collection process. All else equal, it increases in an account's outstanding balance: when more money is owed, the bank needs to ensure a greater likelihood of repayment and is therefore more willing to invest in an active treatment of the account. In addition, for high-balance accounts, more forceful treatment actions (e.g., threatening with a lawsuit) are warranted. In our formulation, implementing an account-treatment action (such as establishing first-party contact, entering negotiations for a payment plan, or filing a lawsuit) can increase the repayment intensity to a 7 While the notion of "effort" may suggest a continuous dependence of the change of the repayment intensity, our formulation does allow for instantaneous changes in the intensity dynamics (i.e., jumps); see Sec. 3.1. 8 In the United States, the relevant statutes of limitations vary by state, type of debt, and also depend on the specifics of the credit agreement. According to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:
"In some states, the statute of limitations period begins when you failed to make a required payment on a debt. In other states it is counted from when you made your most recent payment, even if that payment was made during collection. In some states, even a partial payment on the debt will restart the time period. In most states, debt collectors can still attempt to collect debts after the statute of limitations expires (. . . )"
[See https://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1389/what-statute-limitations-on-debt.html for details.] The possibility of early termination of collections by the account holder through filing for bankruptcy protection can be captured in our formulation by increasing the discount rate ρ. certain level (by introducing an intensity jump) and maintain the intensity at this level (by providing a positive intensity thrust) as long as the action remains in effect. In cases where the initial repayment intensity, at the start of the collection process, is below the intensity threshold, an optimal account-treatment action leads to an intensity jump. The impact of the first action includes the concomitant status change of an account when entering the collection process, reflecting also the fact that the account holder's attention has been captured. Subsequent actions do not induce such jumps because they are taken at the optimal time. Instead they tend to maintain a designated level of intensity until the next repayment event triggers a shift in the outstanding balance and repayment intensity, upon which the bank relaxes the collection effort until the repayment likelihood continuously drops to the (now lower) intensity threshold once more. The collection process terminates as soon as the outstanding balance reaches an economic balance threshold below which account treatment is no longer economically viable. From a mathematical perspective, the (unique) optimal collection strategy consists of an impulse control at the time of placement (t = 0), followed by a series of extended treatment intervals with continuous control. Note that an arbitrary collection strategy can consist of more than one impulse, for example because subsequent actions are taken when the repayment intensity has already fallen below the optimal threshold (and consequently below the intensity levels these actions can maintain). Next, we provide a detailed analysis and formal description of the solution to the collection problem (P).
Sufficient Optimality Condition
Without loss of generality, any admissible collection strategy A ∈ A can be represented in the form
where the adapted nonnegative process E(t) describes an infinitesimal extended collection effort applied on a time interval, and where the predictable jumps
, at F-stopping times ϑ k for k ≥ 0 (with ϑ k+1 > ϑ k ), correspond to concentrated collection efforts, each of which has a sizeable impact on the account's repayment likelihood. In this formulation, an account-treatment action (such as establishing firstparty contact, entering negotiations for a payment plan, or filing a lawsuit) is modelled by a fixed intensity levelλ; see Sec. 3.2.3. If the current intensity λ(t) is less thanλ, implementing that action increases the current intensity to this level through a jump of sizeλ − λ(t). For example, initiating negotiation for a repayment plan or filing a lawsuit can induce a jump in the repayment intensity, as these actions may change the account holder's priorities. While in effect, this action maintains the intensity atλ by means of the continuous thrust κ(λ − λ ∞ ), which captures the effect of the action while it is implemented, for example until an agreement for a repayment plan is reached or a court order is obtained. 9 We allow for an action's induced intensity level λ to depend on account-specific information. For example, for a given current intensity λ(t), establishing and maintaining first-party contact through phone calls, emails, or text messages can cause a sizeable intensity transition for "high-quality" accounts, while it may have virtually no impact on the repayment intensity of "low-quality" accounts. For low-quality accounts, achieving the same effect may require a stronger and more expensive treatment action, such as filing a lawsuit. 10 In our formulation, we assume that any intensity level can in principle be attained and maintained as long as the bank is able to absorb the corresponding collection cost. To arrive at an actual practical implementation of an "optimal" collection strategy A * , it is generally necessary to determine a workable approximation using the bank's available collection toolbox. Effective policy-approximation techniques for a given finite set of feasible account interventions are the subject of a future empirical study; see Appendix D for further details.
Given the representation of admissible collection strategies in Eq. (5), a sufficient optimality condition for a solution to the collection problem (P) is obtained using a standard martingale argument; see footnote 2. Theorem 1. Let v * : R 2 + → R be a continuous, almost everywhere (a.e.) differentiable function which satisfies the Bellman equation
and the boundary condition lim λ→∞ v * (λ, w) = −w, where for any ≥ 0 and for any differentiable func-
Then v * is the value function of the collection problem (P).
The Bellman equation (6) establishes the optimality of a candidate value function by testing it for any possible improvement. Specifically, the first term of the minimand on the right-hand side expresses the best net reduction of the expected loss as a result of any positive discrete effort. 11 The second term of this minimand corresponds to the best expected net reduction of the objective for any admissible continuous effort. For = 0, this term (when set to zero) guarantees that a candidate value function is consistent with the autonomous evolution of the intensity (see Eq. (3)), when no account-treatment action is applied. To guarantee that the value function is optimal, it is sufficient that neither of the two terms is negative, so their minimum on the right-hand side of Eq. (6) must vanish. Intuitively, the Bellman equation ensures that neither a discrete nor a continuous collection effort can lead to an improvement in the expected net loss, and, in addition, that if inactivity is optimal, then the account-state evolution is guaranteed to be autonomous. We also note that a solution to the Bellman equation is by construction unique.
Remark 2.
At an optimum, the value of the first term in the variational identity (6), when it exists, can generally be achieved using one of several (and possibly a continuum of) different simultaneous discrete collection efforts. Because the loss is bounded by the outstanding balance w, any optimal discrete effort a * (λ, w) is naturally bounded by w/c < ∞. By the Berge maximum theorem, the set of solutions to a parametrized optimization problem over a compact set (here [0, w/c]) with continuous objective function is compact-valued (Berge 1963, p. 116 ). In particular, there exists a maximal optimal discrete collection effort,
which satisfies the Bellman equation (6) when it is strictly positive. This solution is chosen here in order to exclude an uncountable number of possible sequences of quasi-simultaneous discrete interventions, all of which are theoretically equivalent to implementing the maximal intensity jump a * (λ, w). This is in agreement with our view that in practice an account-treatment action (such as establishing first-party contact, entering negotiations for a payment plan, or filing a lawsuit) can only increase the repayment intensity to a certain level from a currently smaller level λ(t); taking the same action multiple times would not lead to a larger intensity jump.
Corollary 1. Eq. (6) partitions the attainable account states (λ, w) ≥ 0 (i.e., the "state space" R 2 + ) into three disjoint regions:
where
11 The complementarity of the terms in Eq. (6), relating to discrete and continuous collection efforts, requires excluding the somewhat trivial situation where a * (λ, w) = 0. Thus, if a is required to be strictly positive, the corresponding minimum may not exist and in that case its value is set to +∞. Dropping this restriction, the largest optimal discrete effort in Eq. (8) (ii) a "holding region,"
(iii) a "continuation region,"
Given any two regions the third can be obtained as their complement in the state space R 2 + . These regions are illustrated in Fig. 1a . The action region A * comprises all points of the state space at which an immediate discrete collection effort is best. The holding region H * is formed by points on the boundary of the action region A * , from which-in the absence of any collection effort-the account state would drift immediately into A * ; 12 see Fig. 1b . From within A * , the optimal discrete collection effort moves the account state to the holding region H * where it becomes best to apply a continuous collection effort so as to keep the debtor engaged, thus maintaining the current repayment intensity. Finally, the complement of A * ∪ H * is the continuation (or inaction) region C * where collection actions are economically inefficient.
∈ A * : applying the (maximal) optimal discrete collection effort leads to a state outside of the action region. Indeed, Fig. 2 shows a situation where an initial account state lies strictly inside the action region A * and where the optimal discrete collection effort moves the account state to the holding region. (ii) For a corner solution, where a * (λ, w) = 0, by the first-order necessary optimality condition:
the account state in the holding region remains in the holding region H * until a repayment is received, since by construction, κ(λ ∞ − λ) + δ 2 ε * (λ, w) = 0. This is depicted in Fig. 2 where for (λ(t), w) ∈ H * a minimal 12 Given A = 0 and t ∈ [Ti, Ti+1), the point (λ(t), W (t)) ∈ ∂A * lies in H * if and only if λ(t) > λ∞ and (λ(t), W (t)) ∈ A * for allt ∈ (t, t + ] and some > 0. Since the repayment probability, P(Ti+1 ∈ (t, t + ]|Ft) = 1 − exp(− t+ t λ(s) ds), goes to zero as → 0 + , with probability 1 there is no repayment in some right-neighborhood of t, so W (t) = W (t) for allt ∈ (t, t + ]. continuous collection effort is applied to keep the value of the intensity λ(t) fixed and to prevent the account state (λ(t), w) from entering into the action region A * . Lastly, for
Constructing the Value Function
To construct the value function v * , it is possible to use a recursive approach which, for any given initial account state (λ, w), converges in a finite number of steps and provides in each iteration an exact solution, restricted to a subset of the attainable subsequent account states. For this, Sec. 3.2.1 derives a semi-analytic solution to the collection problem (P) in the absence of any collection activity, referred to as "autonomous account value." In Sec. 3.2.2, we consider a "terminal collection problem." Its solution determines "terminal" account states, for which the "autonomous account value" satisfies the Bellman equation (6) . Any state trajectory λ(t), W (t) reaches a terminal state with probability 1 in finite time. Hence, the solution in this part of the state space is referred to as the "terminal account value." The latter can be precomputed and thus initializes the recursion. Sec. 3.2.3 introduces a family of "sustained extensions," indexed by the holding intensitiesλ ≥ λ ∞ , to extend the validity of a value function to generate its next iteration by finding the (unique) optimal holding intensity. Finally, Sec. 3.2.4 establishes the optimality of the recursion and provides expressions for the optimal collection strategy. The recursion extends the solution of the collection problem (P) from terminal account states to the entire state space.
Autonomous Account Value
In the absence of any account-treatment action the stochastic evolution of the repayment intensity follows the SDE (3), and the collection cost vanishes. Hence, the value of the untreated account in (P) becomes (minus) the expected discounted value of the autonomous repayment sequence (Z i : i ≥ 1),
for all (λ, w) ≥ 0.
Theorem 2. For any (λ, w) ≥ 0, the autonomous account value can be represented in the form
where (α, β) : R + → R 2 uniquely solves the initial-value probleṁ
for all t ≥ 0.
The representation of the autonomous account value in Eq. (14) decomposes the effects of time value of money (via the discount factor e −ρt ), the self-excitation of the arrival intensity (via the discount factor e −λα(t) ), and its reversion towards the long-run steady state λ ∞ (via the discount factor e −κβ(t) ). For example, if repayments can be made only in full (so F R becomes a Dirac-distribution at r = 1) and there is no mean reversion (so κ = 0), then the repayment intensity is constant, λ(t) ≡ λ, and (α(t), β(t)) = (t, λ ∞ t 2 /2), which by Eq. (14) implies that u(λ, w) = −(λw)/(ρ + λ).
Corollary 2. The autonomous account value in Eq. (13) is such that
+ with the boundary condition limλ →∞ u(λ, w) = −w;
By the preceding result, the expected loss, w + u(λ, w), of an untreated account is decreasing and convex in the repayment intensity λ, while it is increasing and linear in the outstanding balance w; see Fig. 3c and Fig. 3d . Moreover, the expected loss exhibits decreasing differences, in the sense that a positive change in the repayment intensity decreases the expected loss more for higher outstanding balances; see Fig. 3b . (15)- (16) is increasing and such that
), for all t ≥ 0. Thus, by Eq. (14) the autonomous account value can be bounded from below, for all
The last inequality implies a lower bound for expected loss given default in the absence of active collections,
which may be used to determine the capital at risk in the issuing bank's delinquent account portfolio.
Terminal Account Value
An immediate implication of Cor. 2(i) is that u(λ, w) is the value function of the collection problem (P) for any account state (λ, w) in a subset of the continuation region C * , for which the trajectory (λ(t), W (t)) t≥0 , with (λ(0), W (0)) = (λ, w), is guaranteed to remain in the continuation region. For such account states, Remark 3(i) implies that the collection problem (P) simplifies to:
where upon expending the optimal effort a * 0 (λ, w), the bank obtains the autonomous value function at the new intensity. We refer to the above problem as the terminal collection problem, since-no matter if the outstanding debt is paid in full or not-it will never be optimal to attempt active collections again.
Note that since ∂ 12 u < 0 ≤ ∂ 11 u by Cor. 2, the minimand of (TCP) is supermodular in (a 0 , λ) and submodular in (a 0 , w), so that the discrete terminal collection effort a * 0 (λ, w) is decreasing in λ and increasing in w. Hence, a trivial discrete terminal effort a * 0 (λ, w) = 0 implies that the optimal account treatment remains trivial for larger intensities and smaller balances, i.e., a * 0 (λ,ŵ) = 0 for all (λ,ŵ) withλ ≥ λ andŵ ≤ w. On the other hand, any nontrivial a * 0 (λ, w) > 0 satisfies the necessary (and here also sufficient) optimality condition by Fermat,
whereĉ = c/δ 2 , as in Remark 3, denotes the effective marginal collection cost, i.e., the marginal collection cost c relative to the sensitivity δ 2 of the intensity process with respect to the collection effort. Thus, the smallest balance w above which the terminal collection effort remains nontrivial for some positive λ is such that ∂ 1 u(0, w ) = −ĉ, i.e., by Thm. 2:
For any w exceeding the minimal actionable balance w , consider the intensity threshold λ * 0 (w), below which the discrete terminal collection effort is nontrivial. By the optimality condition (19), λ * 0 (w) is the unique solution of ∂ 1 u(λ, w) = −ĉ, for w > w . Note that, similar to a * 0 (λ, w), submodularity of u implies that λ * 0 (w) is (strictly) increasing in w with lim w→∞ λ * 0 (w) = ∞. 13 Defining λ * 0 (w) 0 for w ≤ w , we can write the terminal value function in (TCP) as
Let w * 0 be the unique balance w at which the intensity threshold λ * 0 (w) is equal to the long-run steady-state intensity λ ∞ , i.e., λ * 0 (w * 0 ) = λ ∞ . Then by Cor. 1, for balances w ∈ [0, w * 0 ] we conclude that the holding region H * is empty, and starting from λ ≥ λ * 0 (w), λ(t) never becomes smaller than λ * 0 (w). Consequently in this region, the solution to the terminal collection problem (TCP) coincides with the solution to the (general) collection problem (P).
, the value function v * (λ, w) of the collection problem (P) is equal to the value function v * 0 (λ, w) of the terminal collection problem (TCP).
The following properties follow directly from Cor. 2.
is C 1 and has second-order derivatives a.e. Moreover,
13 The claim follows, since by Cor.
Based on the fact that by Thm. 3 for a sufficiently small outstanding balance the collection problem (P) can be reduced to a terminal collection problem, the optimal collection strategy can be inferred from the value function v * 0 characterized in Eq. (20) .
, the continuation, holding, and action regions are given by
respectively. The optimal collection strategy for an account in such states, i.e., the optimal solution to the collection problem (P), is A * (t) ≡ a * 0 λ, w , for t > 0.
The intuition behind Thm. 3 and the optimal collection strategy in Cor. 4 is that for accounts with outstanding balance below w * 0 it is either economically inefficient to attempt collection or else worthwhile to make only a single collection attempt (e.g., by establishing contact via a phone call, an email, or a letter to remind the holder about the overdue balance). Expending further collection effort is not advised, since the additional collection cost will exceed the expected recovery. Fig. 3a depicts w and w * 0 for the case studied in Sec. 4.
Sustained Extensions
For any λ,λ ≥ λ ∞ with λ ≥λ, consider the cumulative distribution function of a "sustained" intensity process according to SDE (3), which starts at λ(0) = λ, is bounded from below byλ, and proceeds until the next repayment event at a random time T ≥ 0,
is the critical timet ≥ 0 at which λ(t) = ϕ(t, λ) =λ, and
Since Φ λ,λ is strictly increasing in (λ,λ), a decrease in the initial value λ or a decrease in the lower boundλ produces a first-order stochastically dominant shift of the cumulative distribution function F λ,λ . The payment distribution is stochastically delayed if its intensity starts at a lower value or is sustained at a smaller lower bound. Lemma 1. The expected present value of a unit repayment under a sustained intensity process is
where, for λ ≥λ ≥ λ ∞ ,
, the expected present value of a unit repayment while the intensity is being sustained atλ.
Given the current state (λ(0), W (0)) = (λ, w) ∈ R 2 + , let λ(T ), W (T ) be the state that can be reached after the next repayment at T . Moreover, let v λ(T ), W (T ) be (minus) the expected net account value right after the repayment at T by following an admissible collection strategy A ∈ A over [T, ∞). Consider now an extension of this policy which prescribes maintaining the repayment intensity aboveλ until the repayment time T . After a repayment, the original collection strategy A (that leads to the value function v) is applied. For λ ≥λ, by La. 1, this "sustained-extension strategy" lowers the expected loss because
wherev
is (minus) the expected value of the account in state (l, w), given a (partial) repayment. In order to maintain the intensity atλ after having reached it, the bank needs to expend a continuous collection effort
. The expected present value of the cost for sustaining the repayment intensity atλ until the next repayment is therefore
Hence, given any outstanding balance w ≥ 0, the expected (minus) net account value under the sustainedextension strategy can be described by the sustained-extension operator
For λ <λ, a sustained-extension strategy requires an immediate intensity jump of size a(λ,λ) = (λ − λ)/δ 2 , moving the repayment intensity from λ toλ, followed by the continuous collection effort E(s) = κ/δ 2 (λ−λ ∞ ) for s ≥ 0 to hold the intensity atλ, so that the sustained-extension operator is defined as
The next result establishes invariance properties of Sλ.
Lemma 2. Assume thatλ ≥ λ ∞ and let v : R 2 + → R − be a C 1 -function that has second-order derivatives a.e. Moreover, assume that
is such that
(ii)v is continuously differentiable with respect toλ. Moreover, ∂ 2v is decreasing inλ.
The sustained extension Sλv preserves most first-and second-order monotonicity properties of v. Note that while for an arbitrary levelλ the functionv(·;λ) is generically not convex in λ, as is shown in the next subsection, this second-order monotonicity is preserved at "the optimal level," when extending an (optimal) value function of the collection problem to a larger domain of account states. The intensity dynamics induced by the sustained-extension operator resemble the effects of an account-treatment action. As noted in Sec. 3.1, each account-treatment action can sustain a certain intensity levelλ. Implementing an account-treatment action increases the intensity toλ, provided the current intensity is smaller, and it maintains the intensity atλ as long as the action remains in effect.
Optimal Account Value
The key idea for constructing the value function v * (λ, w) of the collection problem for all (λ, w) ≥ 0 consists in recursively extending a known value function, valid for small balances, to successively include larger balances. As shown in Sec. 3.2.2, the value function of the collection problem (P) is the terminal value function v * 0 (λ, w) in Eq. (20) for all w ∈ [0, w * 0 ]. For any given outstanding balance w > w * 0 , the recursive construction of the value function v * on R + × [0, w] can be completed in a finite number of iterations, provided that repayments cannot become arbitrarily small.
Minimal-Repayment Assumption (MRA). There exists a positive minimal (relative) repayment r ∈ (0, 1) such that the support of F R is contained in [r , 1].
In practice, MRA is satisfied because there is a natural lower bound z imposed by any discrete currency on nonzero absolute repayment amounts (e.g., z = $0.01), and one can set r = z/w. 14 For a given minimal relative repayment r and w > w * 0 , the integer
is an upper bound for the number of repayments until a positive outstanding balance is repaid up to the economic balance threshold w * 0 , below which it makes no economic sense to actively pursue collection. For any i ≥ 1, let w * i w * 0 (1 − r) −i denote the maximum outstanding balance which may require at most i repayments for the outstanding amount to drop to or below w * 0 , so i(w) ≤ i if and only if w ≤ w * i ; see Fig. 3a . Moreover, assume that the value function v * i−1 of the collection problem (P) for account states in R + × [0, w * i−1 ] is obtained and has the following characteristic properties.
and has second-order derivatives a.e. In addition, v * i−1 satisfies the following three 'value properties:'
Applying the sustained-extension operator Sλ on v * i−1 extends the definition of
The intensity levelλ, at which the sustained extension v i is being held before the next repayment is subject to optimization, leading to the i-th collection-continuation problem,
By Eq. (27) , it is v i (λ, w;λ) > v i (λ, w; λ) forλ large enough, so that the solution of (CCP i ) must be finite, and must therefore also exist-by the Weierstrass theorem (Bertsekas 1995, p. 540). Moreover, since the first-order necessary optimality condition of the i-th collection-continuation problem (CCP i ), obtained by setting the derivative of v i (λ, w;λ) with respect toλ to zero,
14 MRA can be relaxed by taking the limit for r → 0 + . For any r, the construction of the value function presented in this paper is exact relative to the repayment distribution FR. The latter is empirically indistinguishable from a distribution that satisfies MRA by identifying r with the lowest observed nonzero relative repayment.
is independent of λ, it can be concluded that the optimalλ depends only on w. 15 Denoting by λ * i (w) thê λ ≥ λ ∞ that solves the above optimality condition for w ∈ [w * i−1 , w * i ] the following result establishes existence, uniqueness, as well as monotonicity properties. Theorem 4. The intensity level λ * i (w) exists as a unique solution to Eq. (30); it is increasing in w, and
Recall that the solution to the terminal collection problem (TCP) in Sec. 3.2.2 is the value function of the collection problem (P) for w ∈ [0, w * 0 ]. The construction of the value function can now proceed by recursion for i ≥ 1. Specifically, for any (λ,
Building on La. 2(i), setting the holding intensityλ equal to λ * i (w) yields the value properties.
Lemma 3. The function v * i satisfies the value properties (P1)-
It follows that v * i is indeed the value function of the collection problem (P), as long as the account balance does not exceed w * i .
is the value function of the collection problem (P).
Analogous to the value function, the state-space partition into continuation, holding, and action regions can also be extended so as to include successively larger balances. For this, consider the continuation, holding, and action regions C * 0 , A * 0 , H * 0 defined in Cor. 4, and for i ≥ 1 set
Then the unique optimal collection strategy follows by iteration from Thm. 5.
0}. An optimal collection strategy for an account with (λ(0),
with A * (0) = 0. For s ≥ 0, the optimal discrete collection effort is a * λ, w = a * i(w) λ, w while the optimal continuous collection effort is given by E * (s) =
The optimal collection strategy in Eq. (32) is admissible (as an element of A) and solves the collection problem (P) for any given account state (λ, w) ≥ 0. It includes a single discrete collection effort a * induced by the first optimal account-treatment action at t = 0 to move the repayment intensity instantaneously to the action-region boundary. The optimal collection strategy also includes a continuous collection effort E * induced by the first and subsequent optimal account-treatment actions so as to hold the repayment intensity at an optimal level when the waiting time between repayment events becomes too large. 
Implementation
The empirical identification of the repayment process is discussed by Chehrazi and Weber (2015) using both maximum-likelihood estimation and the generalized method of moments. Here we introduce optimization and compare the performance of optimized collections with the yield from untreated accounts. For this, we consider the case where the relative repayment distribution is uniform on [r, 1], with a minimal relative repayment of r = 0.1 > 0, so MRA is satisfied. 17 In this implementation, a time period represents a quarter (three months), the mean-reversion constant κ is 0.7, and the long-run steady state is λ ∞ = 0.1. Therefore, in the absence of account-treatment actions, the repayment intensity of an untreated account without repayments, reverts by about 50% (≈ e −0.7 ) each quarter towards λ ∞ . The sensitivity of the repayment process with respect to willingness-to-repay is δ 10 = 0.02, and with respect to ability-to-repay is δ 11 = 0.5. The sensitivity of the repayment process with respect to the collection effort is δ 2 = 1, effectively normalizing the magnitude of effort to be commensurable with the repayment intensity. The bank's quarterly effective discount rate is ρ = 6%, and its marginal cost of effort is c = $6 per additional unit of repayment intensity.
Account Value and Collection Strategy
Consider an account with outstanding balance w = $75 and repayment intensity λ = λ ∞ at the beginning of the collection process (i.e., at t = 0). Fig. 3a depicts the partition of the state space that characterizes the optimal collection-strategy: the shaded area indicates the action region A * ; the portion of its boundary that lies above λ ∞ represents the holding region H * ; the complement of A * ∪ H * is the continuation region C * ; see Eqs. (9) Fig. 3b compares the optimal account value v * (λ, w) for the optimally treated account with the autonomous account value u(λ, w) for the untreated account, given any account state (λ, w) ∈ [0, 2] × [0, $100]. Fig. 3c shows the optimal and autonomous account values for λ = 1, as a function of w. The first vertical line indicates the minimal actionable balance w = $15, below which the two value functions coincide. The second vertical line marks the outstanding balance at the optimal holding level λ * (w) = 1; for larger levels of w the account state (1, w) is in the action region A * . As shown in Sec. 3, the value function v * (λ, w) is concave in w (i.e., it satisfies the value property (P3)). Moreover, as noted in Thm. 2, u(λ, w) is linear in w. Fig. 3d depicts the optimal and autonomous account values at w = $75, as a function of the repayment intensity λ. The vertical lines indicate the long-run steady state λ ∞ and the optimal holding intensity λ * ($75). Note that for λ ≤ λ * (w), v * (λ, w) is affine in λ, while for λ > λ * (w) it becomes convex in λ. By virtue of Thm. 2 the autonomous account value is strictly convex in λ. As the initial intensity grows beyond all bounds, the full outstanding balance can be recovered essentially without account treatment, as limλ →∞ v * (λ, w) = limλ →∞ u(λ, w) = −w, consistent with value property (P1). Fig. 2 shows the particular realization of an account-state trajectory, starting at (W (0), λ(0)) = ($75, 0.1). 18 As the initial account-state is an element of A * , an immediate discrete collection effort introduces an intensity jump, so that, at time t = 0 + , the account-state trajectory continues from ($75, λ(0 + )) in the holding region; see Fig. 2a . Subsequently, the continuous collection effort E * (t) is applied (as obtained in Cor. 5) to prevent the account state from drifting back into the action region, until a repayment is received. The impulse control (at t = 0) together with the subsequent continuous control captures the effect of the first optimal account-treatment action. This action is chosen such that the intensity level it attains (via jump) and maintains (via continuous control) coincides with the optimal level λ * ($75) (or, in practice, is close to λ * ($75)). Note that subsequent optimal account-treatment actions do not induce any jump as they are taken at the optimal time, i.e., before the repayment intensity enters the action region. Figs. 2a-2d show the evolution of the account's repayment intensity, the outstanding balance, and the optimal collection effort, as a function of time. As noted before, in the absence of account treatment, the intensity of the repayments reverts exponentially towards the long-run steady state λ ∞ = 0.1. This reversion tendency is indicated in Fig. 2b by a family of decreasing dashed trajectories which are followed when there are no intensity jumps. The horizontal dashed lines correspond to the optimal holding levels which correspond to the values of λ * (w) in Fig. 2a for the different balances attained by the realization of the jump process W (t).
Receiving a repayment of relative magnitude R i increases the repayment intensity by δ 10 + δ 11 R i , in accordance with the holder's estimated willingness-and ability-to-repay, and it decreases the remaining outstanding balance by W (t)R i . This introduces a jump into the account state that moves it away form the action and holding regions. For the sample path shown in this picture, after four separate repayments (Fig. 2c ) the account balance drops below the economic balance threshold w * 0 = $16.30. Before the fourth repayment, the repayment intensity declines to a level that requires a second collection action by the bank. The optimal effort required at this point is smaller than for the first collection action, primarily because the outstanding balance is considerably smaller; see Fig. 2d . Yet, the second action lasts until the fourth payment is received. As indicated by our model, it cannot be optimal to terminate an account-treatment action before a repayment is received. From a practical point of view, such suboptimal termination is destined to have a negative impact on the credibility of future actions. In this example, the account makes a fifth repayment, in the autonomous (treatment-free) regime below the economic balance threshold w * 0 . Note that because the long-run steady state λ ∞ is strictly positive, all accounts will eventually pay back in full if the bank is willing to wait indefinitely. However, because of the time value of money (ρ > 0), the expected economic account valueV * (λ, w) is strictly less than the outstanding balance.
Model Misspecification and Robustness Analysis
The parameter vector (κ, δ 10 , δ 11 , δ 2 ) determines an account's repayment behavior. It is critical to understand how each parameter affects the optimal collection strategy as well as the optimal account value. actions, thus increasing the size of the optimal action region and the optimal account value. We focus below on the interesting effects of changing κ and δ 11 . The effect of δ 10 on the optimal action region and the optimal account value is similar to δ 11 . Regarding perturbations of κ, Fig. 4a shows how the boundary of the optimal action region changes in response to a ±50% variation. A larger value of κ increases the rate at which the repayment intensity declines to λ ∞ . Consequently, in comparison to the base case, it is costlier to maintain any intensity level. The impact of this change on the boundary of the optimal action region depends on the magnitude of the outstanding balance. For large balances, this translates to earlier and more forceful account treatment: larger expected rewards justify higher collection cost. For small balances, however, treatment actions are delayed and less forceful: the size of expected repayments may not justify an immediate additional collection outlay, so that treatment actions are delayed until absolutely necessary. Converse effects obtained when decreasing κ, since a slower reversion of the intensity to its long-run steady-state implies a longer lasting effect of the treatment action. Thus, for high balances it is optimal to delay treatment activities, since if the account state is in the inaction region, (i) the intensity is already large enough, and (ii) it declines sufficiently slowly for a repayment to arrive. In the unlikely event that a repayment is not made, a weaker treatment action proves optimal, since the intensity declines at a slower pace, so the impact of an action lasts longer. For small balances, it is optimal to expedite an action, primarily because it is cheaper to implement and also because its effects last longer. Fig. 4c and Fig. 4e illustrate the relative change in the value function, for both optimally treated and untreated (autonomous) accounts, when κ changed by 50% either way. As in Figs. 3b-3d , the blue lines (marked by squares) show the contours for the relative change of the optimal account value, whereas the brown lines (marked by circles) represent the contours of the relative change in the autonomous account value. Since for low balances there is no treatment, the contour levels coincide for small w. A higher κ decreases the account value, so the change becomes negative (Fig. 4c) . Conversely, a smaller κ increases the account value, resulting in a positive change (Fig. 4e) . Disregarding the signs, the relative change for the optimized account value slightly exceeds that for the autonomous account value; however, both are significantly below 50%.
The impact of δ 11 on the size of the optimal action region and on the optimal account value is monotone. A larger δ 11 produces a larger intensity jump when a unit repayment arrives, thus increasing also the likelihood of further repayment events, therefore leading to a higher account value. In addition, an increase in future repayment likelihood reduces the need for collection actions, thus shrinking the size of the optimal action region (Fig. 4b) . Fig. 4d and 4f illustrate the contour levels of the relative change in the autonomous and optimal account value caused by +50% and −50% change in δ 11 , respectively. Similar to Fig. 4b and 4e , the absolute values of these changes remain significantly below 50%.
As mentioned in Sec. 2.1, the intensity process λ(t) can be viewed as the best Bayesian estimate of the actual (unobservable) repayment intensity when the bank dynamically updates its belief according to the observed repayment history; see Appendix C for details. It is therefore instructive to examine how model misspecification may impact account value and collection cost; see Table 1 . 19 In particular, we assume that an account's true parameters are (κ, δ 10 , δ 11 , δ 2 ) = (0.7, 0.2, 0.5, 1) and examine the account value, collection cost, and relative error when instead of the optimal collection strategy A * for the true account parameters, the collection strategy A for misspecified account parameters is used. For example, when the bank estimates κ with +50% error, i.e., incorrectly assumes κ = 1.05 instead of κ = 0.7, the account value decreases from its maximum $55.69, obtained from the optimal collection strategy A * , to $55.58, obtained by the suboptimal collection strategy A, and the cost of collection increases from $10.69 to $11.42; cf. first column of Table 1 .
Despite a significant model misspecification error, the relative error in the optimal account value remains usually small. There are two main reasons for this inherent robustness. First, as noted earlier, the action/inaction boundary is not sensitive to changes in the values of account parameters. Second, the error in action/inaction boundary affects the outcome only when the account state hits this boundary. As can be observed in Fig. 2 , after an account is set on its recovery path, the account state tends to remain in the inaction region, limiting its exposure to the consequences of misspecification. The impact of model misspecification on the collection cost is more difficult to predict. For example, one may expect that overestimating κ reduces the cost of collection, as this shrinks the action region; see Fig. 4a . However, somewhat surprisingly the collection cost increases; see Table 1 . Under misspecified dynamics, the intensity hits the action region more frequently, so the bank unnecessarily takes more account-treatment actions, thus driving up collection cost in expectation.
Collectability Improvement
In terms of the present value of an account, any nontrivial account treatment produces a first-order stochastically dominant shift in the revenue distribution over any given time horizon. The solid lines in Figs. 5a and 5b show the (gross) present-value distributions for untreated (autonomous) and optimally treated accounts, respectively. 20 For our example, the expected present value of the repayment increases from $38.01 to $66.38, corresponding to an almost 75-percent increase from 50.7% to 88.5% of the outstanding balance. Moreover, the coefficient of variation gross collections decreases significantly, from 46.9% to 8.7%. This illustrates that any nontrivial treatment strictly improves the asset quality of nonperforming loans, by both increasing returns and decreasing risk. The dashed lines in Figs. 5a and 5b indicate the distribution of the net present account value, i.e., the optimal value of the account including the collection costs. For any account with initial outstanding balance above the economic balance threshold w * 0 , placement in collections translates to expending immediate positive effort to bring the account's repayment intensity from λ(0) = λ ∞ to λ(0 + ) > λ ∞ . This leads to a guaranteed lower bound for the overall collection cost, which includes investments related to establishing and continuing collections. As a result, a full net recovery of the outstanding amount is impossible for an optimally treated account (unless it starts with a repayment intensity outside A * ). Hence, the autonomous repayment distribution cannot be first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution of the net present account value.
Conclusion
Based on the results presented in Sec. 3, a bank's optimal collection strategy maps any possible state of the account, expressed as a point (λ, w) in the (intensity, balance)-space to an optimal action. The optimal account treatment aims at maintaining the repayment intensity at a minimum level λ * (w) until a repayment is received and the outstanding balance eventually falls below the economic balance threshold w * 0 , at which point it is best to suspend an active pursuit of the account. The optimal holding intensity λ * (w) is increasing in the outstanding balance, leading to stronger (i.e., more aggressive) collection actions for larger outstanding balances w. The economic balance threshold increases in the marginal effective collection costĉ, as the quotient of the marginal collection cost c and the collection effectiveness (i.e., sensitivity of the repayment intensity with respect to actions) δ 2 . These critical performance indicators allow banks to sort collection agencies and thus to devise an optimal agency-assignment policy. Because of the increase in asset quality through collections, alluded to in Sec. 4, an optimal collection strategy has the potential to significantly reduce the bank's loss given default and thus also to lessen its required capital reserves, not only because of the decrease in outstanding balances but because the pure risk in the collection of an outstanding balance is lowered by the bank's implementation of the optimal account-treatment strategy or an approximation thereof (see App. D); an in-depth treatment of approximately optimal collection strategies taking explicitly into account a bank's limited number of treatment measures is left as an interesting topic for future research.
Beyond the specific practical implications for a bank's optimal debt-collection strategy, the findings have implications for the control of (affine) self-exciting point processes. In this context, the construction of a semianalytical solution for the value function together with a complete characterization of an optimal policy is new. Earlier results, including those by Costa and Davis (1989) , focus on the successive approximation of solutions. A monotonicity in the state evolution (balance decreasing with each repayment event) is exploited to obtain a recursive extension of the domain of an exact value function, so as to include any finite initial state in a finite number of iterations. The proposed approach has the added value of providing a complete description of firstand second-order monotonicity as well as limiting behavior, in the form of "value properties;" see Sec. 3.2.4. This in turn allows for important economic insights, such as, in our application, about the (dis-)economies of scale in collections as a function of the size of the outstanding consumer loan and the bank's account-treatment effort.
Appendix A: Proofs
The following auxiliary result is used in the proof of Thm. 1. where λ(t) is the solution of Eq. (4) for the initial condition λ(0) = λ, and W (t) = w − i Z i 1 {Ti≤t} . If v * is such that (i) H(t; A) is a submartingale for any admissible collection strategy A ∈ A, and (ii) there exists an admissible A * ∈ A for which H(t; A * ) is a martingale, then
and the collection strategy A * attains the minimum.
Proof. Note first that at t = 0, it is H(0; A) = v * (λ, w). The submartingale property of H(t; A) implies that v
−ρs dW (s) is bounded and decreasing in t,
is an increasing function of t, and v * is bounded, using the definition of the expectation operator and the monotone-convergence theorem, one obtains
Consequently,
By the martingale property the infimum is attained for the admissible collection strategy A * ∈ A, which completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is enough to show that v * satisfies the conditions of Prop. A1, which implies that it is the value function of the collection problem (P). Note that the boundary condition, lim λ→∞ v * (λ, w) = −w, yields that v * is bounded on R + × [0, w]. To simplify the rest of the proof, we denote by
the value along a state trajectory, and by
with τ 0 0, the (discrete) collection-event times. The latter lead to intensity jumps, be it via repayments (i.e., jumps in J) or via discrete collection efforts (i.e., jumps in A). Furthermore, let
be the number of (discrete) collection events, including repayments up to and including t and discrete collection efforts up to but not including t. 21 With the expected relative repaymentr = 1 0 r dF R (r) as in Eq. (2), it is 21 The intensity process is right-continuous at the τ k due to repayment events because these events are not predictable, while it is left-continuous at the τ k due to the (predictable) discrete collection efforts.
where the first term on the right-hand side is a martingale and the last two lines decompose e −ρt ν * (t)−ν * (0) into sums of increments at and between the jumps of (λ(t), W (t)), respectively. Since ν * is continuous between any two consecutive jumps (and after the last jump), one obtains
and
Note that on each interval τ k−1 , min{τ k , t} , 1 ≤ k ≤ η(t) + 1, the outstanding balance W (t) and the discrete portion A(t) − [0,t] E(s) ds of the action process A(t) are constant, so by Eq. (4):
Hence, the last line of Eq. (34) simplifies to
For the repayment events, one obtains
where for any Borel-subset B ∈ B([0, 1]) the processN (t, B) counts, on [0, t], the number of all repayment events with relative repayments in B. 22 Note that the first term on the right-hand side of the preceding equation is a martingale. Finally, at the times of discrete collection efforts it is
Combining these results, Eq. (34) can be written in the form 22 As an alternative to the SDE (4), one can describe the evolution of the repayment intensity also in integral form:
Hence, since by the Bellman equation (6) 
The definition of a * (λ, w) also allows us to conclude that when (λ, w) / ∈ A * , it is ∂ 1 v * (λ, w) ≥ −ĉ and hence, minâ >0 {v * (λ + δ 2â , w) + câ} does not have any solution in this region. Therefore, in order for v * to satisfy Eq. (6), min ≥0 {D v * (λ, w)} has to be well-defined and equal to zero. However, this immediately follows, since D v * (λ, w) is an affine function of whose slope is ∂ 1 v * (λ, w) +ĉ ≥ 0. Then by the definitions in Eqs. (10)- (11), (λ, w) / ∈ A * is either assigned to
-Now let A * (0) 0, and define
where E * (s) = ε * λ(s), W (s) (see Remark 3 for the definition of ε * (λ, w)). Note that by definition, A * is leftcontinuous, non-decreasing, and adapted to F. At t = 0, A * introduces a jump of size δ 2 a * (λ, w) in the intensity process if and only if (λ, w) ∈ A * . For any t > 0, by the definition of ε * (λ, w), it is guaranteed that (λ(t), W (t)) / ∈ A * over which (D E * (t) v * ) λ(t), W (t) = 0. Consequently, for strategy A * , the last two lines of Eq. (35) are zero and H(t; A * ) is a martingale. This concludes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. See the proof of Thm. 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. The arguments in the proofs of Prop. A1 and Thm.1 imply the result, provided (D 0 u)(λ, w) = 0. The latter can be verified by direct calculation, as follows:
Using Eqs. (15)- (16), we obtain
as claimed.
Proof of Corollary 2. (i)
The first claim has already been established in the proof of Thm. 2. For the second claim, note that for any t > 0 such that α(t) = 0,α(t) =r > 0; therefore, α(t) and β(t) are strictly positive for t > 0. Hence, aŝ λ → ∞, the integrand in Eq. (13) converges uniformly to zero, which implies the results.
(ii) The claims follow by direct calculation:
Note that for w > 0, all inequalities become strict. (iii) The claims follow immediately from the calculations in parts (i) and (ii), also from the definition of the autonomous account value u(λ, w).
The following auxiliary result is used in the proof of Thm. 3.
Moreover, the (nonpositive) decrement u λ + δ 2 a * 0 (λ, w), w + ca * 0 (λ, w) − u(λ, w) is (i) increasing in λ, (ii) decreasing in w, and (iii) concave with respect to w.
Proof. Since u(·, w) is strictly convex (see part (ii) of Cor. 2), the minimizer is unique (i.e., the argument of the minimization problem is a singleton). Parts (i) and (ii) can be shown by direct calculation (using the envelope theorem):
where the last inequality holds, since by Cor. 2(ii), ∂ 12 u(λ, w) < 0. Concavity follows, since u(λ+δ 2â , w)+câ−u(λ, w) is concave (affine) in w, and this property is preserved under pointwise minimization.
Proof of Theorem 3. By construction, v *
(λ, w) is continuous and has continuous first-order derivatives (see the proof of Cor. 3 for details). For λ > λ
Consequently, it follows that min a0>0 {u(λ + δ 2 a 0 , w) + ca 0 } has no solution, and Proof of Lemma 1. Assuming λ ≥λ ≥ λ ∞ , the present value of a unit repayment under sustained intensity process is
Using a change of variable, the first integral becomes
Substituting the expression of θ(λ,λ), given in the main text, yields
Combining these two integrals gives the result.
Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Similar to Cor. 3, it is enough to show thatv(λ, w;λ) is continuously differentiable at λ =λ. Note that the continuity ofv(λ, w;λ) follows from the definition. For λ >λ, it is
For λ <λ, ∂ 1v (λ, w;λ) = −ĉ and ∂ 2v (λ, w;λ) = ∂ 2v (λ, w)Q(λ,λ). The derivative of Q(λ,λ) with respect to λ is
so that lim λ→λ + ∂ 1v (λ, w;λ) = −ĉ, and lim λ→λ + ∂ 2v (λ, w;λ) = lim λ→λ − ∂ 2v (λ, w;λ). The first-and second-order monotonicity ofv with respect to w follow from the corresponding properties of v and the fact that these properties are preserved by (discounted) expectation. The monotonicity ofv and ∂ 2v with respect to λ are obtained, since for λ ≥λ:
In particular,ĉ κ(λ − λ ∞ )/λ Q(λ,λ) is decreasing in λ. Moreover, the functionsv max{λ, ϕ(λ, s)}, w e −ρs and ∂ 2v max{λ, ϕ(λ, s)}, w e −ρs are increasing in s. Hence, if λ 1 > λ 2 >λ, then by the first-order stochastic dominance order in the family of distributions F λ,λ , as discussed in the main text, it is
and similarly
(ii) Sincev(λ, w;λ) is continuously differentiable with respect toλ as long asλ = λ, one can restrict attention to checking that its right-and left-derivatives coincide forλ = λ. Forλ > λ, substituting the expression for Q(λ,λ) using Eq. (22) and taking the derivative ofv(λ, w;λ) with respect toλ yields
Similarly, forλ < λ, by direct calculation:
Hence, one obtains
. The second claim follows, since for λ <λ, Q(λ,λ) =λ/(ρ +λ) is positive and increasing, while ∂ 2v (λ, w) is negative and decreasing. For λ ≥λ, similar to part (i), the result holds, since ∂ 2v max{λ, ϕ(λ, s)}, w e −ρs is an increasing function of s, and forλ 1 >λ 2 ,
which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. The derivative of f i (λ, w) with respect toλ is
the inequality holds, since by Eq. (24)
and by the value properties (P2)-(P3) it is ∂ 1 v * i−1 (λ, w) ≥ −ĉ and ∂ 11 v * i−1 (λ, w) ≥ 0. Since by the value property (P2) it is limλ →∞ ∂ 1 v * i−1 (λ, w) = 0, the gradient f i (λ, w) must be positive as long asλ is large enough. Therefore it is possible to restrict attention to establishing that f i (λ, w) ≤ 0 for some finiteλ ≥ 0.
23 Taking the derivative f 1 (λ ∞ , w) with respect to w and using the value property (P3) yields that
which implies the result. For i > 1, the claim follows via induction using a similar argument. Specifically, assume that
On the other hand, by the definition of v i (λ, w;λ) and v * i−1 (λ, w), as well as by virtue of the value properties:
the last inequality is implied by the value property (P3). Hence, f i (λ * i−1 (w * i−1 ), w) is negative for w ∈ w * i−1 , w * i , which allows us to conclude that λ * i (w) exists. -The uniqueness of the solution follows from the fact that when the optimality condition f i (λ, w) = 0 holds, then the second-order condition ∂ 1 f i (λ, w) > 0 is also satisfied. Indeed, if this is not true, then ∂ 1 f i (λ, w) = 0, which implies ∂ 1v * i−1 (λ, w) = −ĉ and ∂ 11v * i−1 (λ, w) = 0. But this means that ∂ 1 v * i−1 (λ + δ 10 + δ 11 R, w(1 − R)) = −ĉ and ∂ 11 v * i−1 (λ + δ 10 + δ 11 R, w(1 − R)) = 0, F R -almost surely. By the value properties it is ∂ 11 v * i−1 (λ, w) ≥ 0 and ∂ 1 v * i−1 (λ, w) ≥ −ĉ, so ∂ 1 v * i−1 (λ + δ 10 + δ 11 R, w(1 − R)) = −ĉ and ∂ 11 v * i−1 (λ + δ 10 + δ 11 R, w(1 − R)) = 0 for any λ <λ. Hence, f i (λ, w) = 0 for λ ≤λ, i.e., in particular forλ = λ ∞ . This contradicts the fact that f i (λ, w) is increasing inλ and that there existsλ ≥ λ ∞ at which f i (λ, w) < 0. Thus, λ * i (w) must be unique. -Finally, the monotonicity obtains, since ∂ 2 f i (λ, w) < 0.
The following auxiliary result is used in the proof of La. 3. 23 The last expression is obtained by solving for u(λ, w) using (D0u)(λ, w) = 0 and then differentiating with respect toλ.
Proposition A3. For anyλ ≥ λ ∞ , v i (λ, w;λ) has the following properties:
Proof. (i) Using the calculations in the proof of La. 2(i), it is
which implies the claim.
(ii) The result is obtained analogously to the proof of La. 2(i). (iii) The second derivative of v i (λ, w;λ) with respect to λ is
Taking the limit and substituting the corresponding expressions for v i (λ, w;λ) and
which completes the proof. 
where the derivative with respect to w is obtained using the envelope theorem.
where as before, the optimality of λ * i (w) (see Eq. (30)) taken into account when computing the derivative of v * i with respect to w. Therefore, by continuity of λ *
It remains to be shown that lim w→(
Value properties (P1)-(P3). Similar to the proof of La. 2(i), v * i (λ, w) is decreasing and concave in w, since v * i−1 (λ, w) is decreasing and concave in w, and these properties are preserved under both (discounted) expectation and point-wise minimization. Moreover, by Envelope Theorem, 
Taking the derivative of v i (λ, w;λ) with respect toλ yields
Equivalently, using the definition of v i (λ, w;λ), definition (26), and Eq. (22), one obtains
Combining the preceding two equations implies that
Based on this, taking the derivative with respect toλ gives
where the last inequality follows from the convexity of v * i−1 (λ, w). Hence,
so that by Eq. (40), ∂ 11 v * i (λ, w) never vanishes in the first place. -Lastly, we need to prove that 0 ≥ v * w) , where the first inequality holds because 0 ≥ v * i−1 (λ, w). For λ ≤ λ ∞ , the last claim holds, since 0 ≥ĉλ 
and the minimum value is equal to v * i (λ, w). It only remains to be established that for λ ∈ [0, λ *
By Prop. A3, equality is obtained at λ * i (w); hence, it is sufficient to show that the above expression is decreasing with respect to λ. The latter holds because by taking the derivative with respect to λ:
which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 5. The result can be found as in Cor. 1.
Appendix B: Notation
Marginal cost of effort
Cumulative relative repayment process (ability-to-repay)
Sustained-extension operator (with holding intensityλ) R + t Time in the collection process
Arrival time of i-th repayment
Outstanding balance (at t)
Amount of i-th repayment R + (α(t), β(t))
Solution to the initial-value problem (15)-
Sensitivity of λ(t) with respect to J(t) R 2 + δ 2 Sensitivity of λ(t) with respect to A(t)
Mean-reversion rate of the intensity process
Flow of intensity (between jumps) R + Table B1 : Summary of notation.
Appendix C: Comparison with Hidden-Markov Model Variant
As noted in Sec. 2, we provide here a simple model for repayments with an unobservable arrival rate, and show that in a Bayesian setting the dynamics of the repayment intensity, viewed as the expected value of the repayment-arrival rate conditional on available information, is qualitatively equivalent to the intensity dynamics implied by the self-exciting point process with law of motion specified in Eq. (3) of the main text.
Preliminaries. Consider a Markov jump process M (t), defined for t ≥ 0, whose states belong to the set S = {L, H}.
Given that M (t) = H at the current time t, the next state-transition event (at a random transition time τ H ) arrives at the rate Λ H . Upon arrival of a state transition at time τ H ≥ t, the process M will either remain in state H (with probability p H ) or move to state L (with probability 1 − p H ); see Fig. C1a . Similarly, if M (t) = L, the next transition arrives at the rate Λ L , and upon arrival of such a transition at τ L , M will either remain in state L (with probability p L ) or move to state H (with probability 1 − p L ). The Markov jump process M is not observable, yet its value affects the arrival rate of an observable Poisson process (T i , i ≥ 1). If M is in state H (resp., L), the unobservable arrival rateλ(t) of the observable Poisson process is equal to λ H (resp.,λ(t) = λ L ), where-without any loss of generality-we assume throughout that λ L < λ H . Let F = (F t , t ≥ 0) denote the filtration generated by (T i , i ≥ 1) and N (t) = i 1 {Ti≤t} the corresponding counting process. Our goal is to characterize the dynamics of Π H (t) P(M (t) = H|F t ), i.e., the probability of M being in state H, which in turn allows us to determine the expected arrival intensity λ(t) E[λ(t)|F t ]. Bayraktar and Ludkovsky (2009) carry out this task for a general Markov process with the aid of infinitesimal generators. Here, we derive the corresponding results in a more elementary way by taking advantage of the fact that the state space S is binary.
Proposition C1. The probability Π H (t) satisfies the ordinary differential equatioṅ
for all t ≥ 0 with t = T N (t) , i.e., between any two consecutive observable events (T i , i ≥ 1).
Proof. Between any two observable events, i.e., for t = T N (t) , the probability
can be decomposed using the law of total probability, and is equal to 
Using Bayes' rule, it is
see Eqs. (43)- (46) for details. Consequently,
.
Similarly, it is
Note that
since the chance of M switching from H to L within (t − , t) more than once is of the order of 2 . Similarly,
where the chance of having more than one event for M , irrespective of whether it leads to a change in the state, is of the order of 2 . Repeating the above argument produces
Finally,
where again, the likelihood of having M switching from L to H within (t − , t) more than once is of the order of 2 . Combining Eqs. (43)- (46) one obtains
Finally, substituting the above in Eq. (42) gives
which leads to the ordinary differential equation (41) as claimed.
Proposition C2. Between any two consecutive observable events T i and T i+1 , the probability Π H (t) is given by
where Π H (T i ) is the initial value for t = T i , at the beginning of the inter-arrival interval; furthermore,
Proof. By Prop. C1, the probability Π H satisfies Eq. (41) for all t ∈ (T i , T i+1 ). The equilibrium points π H,1 and π H,2 are obtained by setting the right-hand side to zero. It is 0
positive at x = 0, and negative at x = 1. Eq. (41) is a Riccati differential equation and can be solved using standard methods (see, e.g., Weber 2011, Ch. 2), which-by taking into account the initial value Π H (T i )-yields Eq. (47) .
e., the probability Π H experiences a positive jump regardless of the sign of Π H (t − ) − π H,1 .
Proof. At any t = T N (t), we have
The numerator in the preceding expression can be rewritten as
while the denominator takes the form
Consequently, one obtains
Autonomous Intensity Dynamics. We are now ready to consider the law of motion for the conditional expectation
we interpret the sequence of observable random stopping times (T i , i ≥ 1) as the account holder's repayment events, whereby each repayment is drawn for a certain empirically identified repayment distribution, similar to the assumptions in the main text. In this context, the hidden-Markov jump process M describes the account holder's unobservable repayment priority (with H for "High priority" and L for "Low priority"). The resulting law of motion,
closely resembles the autonomous intensity dynamics obtained in Sec. 2.1, in the sense that it features positive jumps at repayment events and a smooth decrease towards a long-run stationary value (
in the prolonged absence of repayment events; see Figs. 2b and C2a.
Controlled Intensity Dynamics. As discussed in the main text, an account-treatment strategy consists of a sequence of actions. We denote the starting time of a collection action by ϑ and assume that the collection action continues until a repayment is received, i.e., until T N (ϑ)+1 . The first measure taken to implement a suitable collection action often takes the account holder by surprise and can immediately change his priorities, so that M moves from "Low" to "High." Consequently, we assume that if M (ϑ) = L at time t = ϑ, the state of the hidden-Markov jump process can change to H with probability p a . If this transition does not take place at t = ϑ, it will take place at a random time τ a , with arrival intensity (1 − p L,a )Λ L,a as long as the collection action remains in effect (i.e., over [ϑ, T N (ϑ)+1 ]). Upon moving to state H, the Markov jump process M evolution is governed by Λ H,a , and p H,a which have the same interpretation as Λ H and p H before. . When the repayment priority is "High," i.e., M (t) = H, on average 1.5 repayments are received per time unit (quarter). When this priority is "Low," i.e., M (t) = L, the repayment arrival rate is 0.1 per quarter. In the absence of account treatment, this leads to π H,1 = 0.004 and π H,2 = 1.646, determining the intensity's long-run stationary value, λ ∞ = 0.106. Fig. C2a depicts a case where the initial intensity level, at t = 0, is λ ∞ . As in the main text, assuming that the outstanding balance is large enough so (λ ∞ , w) ∈ A * , one can increase and maintain the intensity by taking a suitable account-treatment action. An action, taken at ϑ = 0 with parameter vector (p L,a , p H,a , Λ L,a , Λ H,a , p a ) = (0.10, 0.50, 3.00, 2.00, 0.65), moves the repayment intensity (via a jump caused by p a ) to a new long-run stationary value, λ ∞ = 1.000, compatible with π H,1 = 0.643 and π H,2 = 3.000. The action remains in effect until a repayment is received. During this period, the intensity level remains constant, since the system is held in equilibrium. Upon receiving a repayment, the intensity experiences a positive jump, as described before. For the case illustrated in Fig. C2a , there are no subsequent actions. Consequently, the intensity reverts back to its autonomous long-run stationary value, λ ∞ = 0.106, unless a further repayment is received (e.g., at T 2 = 2.5).
Appendix D: Implementation Details
To aid in the practical implementation of the optimal collection strategy discussed in the main text we now provide a brief discussion of model identification and algorithm for a simple collection strategy constructed from the optimal solution to (P), provided there are only a finite number of (empirically identified) collection actions and attainable intensity levels.
Model Identification. Let y ∈ R n be a vector of account-specific characteristics such as the predefault FICO score and outstanding balance at the point of collections placement. To identify the account-specific parameter vector (κ(y), δ 10 (y), δ 11 (y), δ 2 (y)) one can use the estimation methods developed by Chehrazi and Weber (2015) , given observations of a portfolio of delinquent accounts with respect to collection activity and repayment events over the time interval [0, h] for some h > 0 (usually in the order of 6-24 months). For each account (the index of which is omitted), the set of observed data usually includes the account-specific attribute vector y, the repayment events (T i , R i ) N (h) i=1 and the collection activity (ϑ k , m k )
k=1 , in terms of timing and type of action on [0, h]. At time ϑ k the k-th collection action of type m k (from an available menu of actions M {1, . . . ,m}) is taken, e.g., in form of a legal action or the establishment of a repayment plan with a certain number of instalments. The number of collection actions up to and including time t ∈ [0, h] is denoted by K(t) = k≥1 1 {ϑ k ≤t} . The bank observes the starting time of an action, its termination time (which may coincide with a repayment or a starting time of a subsequent action), and also all specific measures taken to implement the action (which together determine the action type). In addition to the account-specific parameter vector (κ(y), δ 10 (y), δ 11 (y), δ 2 (y)), it is necessary to estimate the common long-run steady-state intensity λ ∞ (which can be set to zero for conservative/robust estimates; see Chehrazi and Weber 2015) , and the vector of action-specific intensitieŝ λ M (λ m ) m∈M . Each action-specific intensity is scaled by δ 2 (y) to pin down its account-specific impact, i.e., the account's responsiveness to the relevant type of collection action. The log-likelihood of observing the repayment times (T i )
, and (ϑ k , m k )
k=1 as a function of (κ(y), δ 10 (y), δ 11 (y), δ 2 (y),
) and λ(ϑ k ) ≤λ m k δ 2 (y), λ m k δ 2 (y) + (λ(T i ) −λ m k δ 2 (y)) exp(−κ(y)(t − T i )), t ∈ [ϑ k , T N (ϑ k )+1 ∧ ϑ k+1 ) and λ(ϑ k ) >λ m k δ 2 (y).
As in lattice theory, the binary ∧-operator denotes the minimum. Assuming an affine dependence of the parameters κ, δ 10 , δ 11 , δ 2 on the vector of account-specific characteristics y (as in Chehrazi and Weber 2015) , maximum-likelihood estimates can be found by maximizing the sum of log-likelihoods over the observed account portfolio, subject to feasibility. discrete instants in time, which, compared to an agent's actual activities (that the authors have witnessed in person, on recordings, and through interviews), capture only a very narrow aspect of the task. Indeed, an effective action typically cannot be implemented instantaneously; a particular measure is often combined with other measures, over multiple days or even weeks. For example, when a pre-agreed repayment date is approaching, automated phone calls, text messages, and reminder emails are sent to the debtor. Once a repayment has been missed and a sufficiently long time has elapsed (so the account state hits the boundary of A * ), attempts are made by the collection team to establish contact and cooperation; indeed, more than one agent may be "working the account" because different skill sets are required or for behavioral reinforcement, somewhat analogous to "good cop/bad cop" interrogation techniques. A significant fraction of the agents' daily routine is therefore spent on automated dialing. Once first-party contact has been established, the next action depends on the state of the account. For example, negotiating an updated repayment schedule requires an agent to review the file, request updated information about the debtor's financial standing and possibly conducting a field visit. To finally determine a sequence of installments, acceptable to all parties, requires additional contact cycles. Thus in reality, the action of restructuring a repayment plan is not as discrete (both in time and intensity level) as it may appear in a data set. A collection agency's menu of actions M is finite not because only a finite set of intensity levels can be achieved a priori, but because the implementation of actions within that agency is often standardized and carried out by the same set of agents in a more or less similar manner. 25 The M-envelope strategy outlined earlier captures the discretization effects caused by standardizing the process. It also captures both discrete and continuous elements of collection efforts, driven by the generic mismatch between the theoretically optimal intensity to implement, as prescribed by the solution A * to (P), and the best feasible intensity level in the approximately optimal collection strategy A * M .
